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Introduction
There are those who believe that in this thirteenth year of 
airline deregulation that the era of consolidation/merger/acqui­
sition is essentially over in the United States. They are probably 
right because of two reasons. One reason, very simply, is that 
the large number of consolidations, mergers, acquisitions and 
bankruptcies have left very few Major carriers on the competi­
tive playing field. The second reason is that the Department of 
Transportation's (DOT) authority over mergers and agreements 
concerning domestic transportation was sunset on December 
31, 1988. On the surface, this reduced number of domestic 
competitors and the additional freedom from regulation ap­
pears to hold nothing but benefits not only for the American 
airline industry but for its international competitors as well. This 
apparent "windfall" from deregulation will be examined in the 
following pages.
As a case in point, European air carriers see decontrol as 
probably their best weapon in the competitive battle. For 
example, the recently signed Luxembourg II Agreement opened 
up the so-called Fifth Freedom Right which will allow such 
carriers as Aer Lingus, British Airways, Air France, KLM and 
Lufthansa to fly between any two European cities, even if both 
cities are outside their home country.1
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The Airline Industy Before 
And After Deregulation
Since 1985, approximately twenty-five (25) mergers and 
acquisitions have occurred; twenty-three (23) were by major 
carriers.2 There were four Major carriers acquired in 1986: 
Peoples Express, Eastern, Republic, and Western which left only 
nine (9) of the former thirteen (13) Major carriers which has 
been further reduced to eight Majors with the acquisition of 
Piedmont by USAir in 1989.3
If all of this has taken place in approximately two-to-three 
years, what has happened to the industry since deregulation 
began in 1978? In sheer numbers alone, thirty-six (36) carriers 
began nearly a decade of deregulation. If every air carrier that 
stated operation, since deregulation of the air passenger seg­
ment of the industry, were still in operation today, there would 
be a grand total of 234* air carriers. However, bankruptcies, 
mergers, consolidations, and ceased operations have claimed a 
staggering 68.8%; including the consummation of the acquisi­
tion of Piedmont by USAir on August 4, 1 989. Over seventy- 
four (74) carriers certificated as Section 401 scheduled airlines 
remained in January, 1987. EXHIBIT 1 and TABLE 1 tell the 
story pictorially and numerically.
Of the remaining seventy-four (74) Section 401 certificated 
air carriers in January, 1987, a net total of only twenty-five (25) 
compete for airline traffic within the continental (48 contiguous 
states) United States (see TABLE 2). Thirty-six operate outside 
the forty-eight states (in Alaska, Pacific, and the Caribbean) 
while thirteen (13) others provide feeder service to larger 
carriers. None of the original mid-sized Regional carriers certifi­
cated prior to 1978 exist today. Ozark, Frontier, North Central, 
Hugh es Air West, Southern, and Texas International have all 
been acquired. Although Allegheny and Piedmont both ac­
quired Major carrier status by the expansion of their route 
structures, they were both acquired by USAir.5
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The scheduled airlines are divided into three classifications: 
Majors, Nationals, and Regionals. TABLE 3: U.S. SCHEDULED 
AIRLINES, PRE- AND POST-MERCER and EXHIBIT 2: CON­
SOLIDATION OF NATIONALS BETWEEN 1986 AND 1991 
identify the carriers in each classification. Forthesake ofbrevity, 
MAJOR airline companies are those airlines, once referred to as 
trunk carriers, and who are now classified as MAJORS because 
they have annual gross revenues over one billion dollars. 
NATIONAL airline companies are those that generate annual 
gross revenues between $75 million and $1 billion. And while 
REGIONAL airline companies have a history of their own, they 
are classified as LARGE REGIONALS if their annual gross 
revenues fall between $10 million and $75 million and ME­
DIUM REGIONALS if annual gross revenues are less than $10 
million. For 1989, it was estimated that the Majors generated 
429 billion revenue passenger miles (RPMs).6
Sunset of DOT Merger Authority
The sunset of DOT's authority to review mergers under 
Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act does not transfer 
authority to review mergers to the Department of Justice nor to 
any other agency. The bottom line is that airline mergers no 
longer require administrative approval. However, when the 
airline industry lost the necessity for administrative approval, it 
also lost the immunity that airline mergers approved by DOT 
had previously obtained under the antitrust laws. As a result, 
airline mergers that violate the Sherman Antitrust Act and the 
Clayton Act now can be challenged in the courts by the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice or by private parties.7 In 
short, the airline companies are now fully subject to the same 
antitrust rules that govern other American industries except for 
some aspects of international aviation.
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Exhibit 1
Consolidation of Pre-deregulation Trunk 
and Local Airlines into Seven Major Airlines
19 Trunks & Locals - 1978 7 Majors - 1991
AMERICAN -AMERICAN
BRANIEF BANKRUPTCY ("NEW” BRANIFF EMERCED AS 
NATIONAL CARRIER)
CONTINENTAL-------BANKRUPTCY-| (PURCHASED BY TEXAS AIR CORP.
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL---------
EASTERN--------------- (BANKRUPTCY, 3/91)








PAN AMERICAN-r-SOLD PACIFIC DIVISION TO UNITED—BANKRUPTCY 
NATIONAL--------- 1 (12-91)
TRANS WORLD------------ 1--------------------------------------------- TRANS WORID
OZARK----------------------------'
UNITED------------------ BOUGHT PAN AM PACIFIC DIVISION — UNITED





SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM AIRLINE CONSOLIDATION. (WASH., D.C.: AIR­
LINE ECO., INC. 1987) p. 20 AND FAA AVIATION FORECASTS. FISCAL YEARS 
1990-2001. U.S. D.O.T., FED. AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, pp. 121-223.
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Table 1
A Numerical History of U.S. Scheduled Airlines Operating 
Under Section 401 Certificates as of January,1987
Certificated prior to 1978






Merged, Liquidated, Decertificated 




Source: Adapted from Airline Consolidation, (Washington, D C: Air- 
line Economics, Inc. 1987), p. 16. Updated to March, 1991.
Table 2
Total Number Of Carriers Operating
In Continental United States Without Feeder Agreements 
With Larger Carrier(s)
Total carriers currently operating 73
Carriers operating totally outside Continental
U.S. (Alaska, Pacific, and Caribbean <36>
Carriers with feeder agreements <1 3>
Total carriers operating in Continental U.S. 
without feeder Agreement with Larger Carriers 24
Source: Adapted from Airline Consolidation, (Washington. D.C: Air- 
line Economics, Inc. 1987), p. 16. Updated to March, 1991.
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Table 3
U.S. Scheduled Airlines 
Pre- and Post-Merger
Pre-Merger: Maiors (12) Nationals (15) Regionals (4)
American AirCal Air Midwest
Continental Alaska Air Wisconsin
Delta Aloha Atlantic S.E.












Post-Merger:: Major (8) National (8) Regionals (2)
American Air Wisconsin Air Midwest
Delta Alaska Air Croup Atlantic S.E.
Northwest Aloha
Pan American America West
Texas Air Corp. Braniff
Trans World Hawaiian
United Midway - (Bankruptcy, 12-91)
USAir Croup Southwest
Source: Adapted from Dr. C. lames. State of The Airline Industry.
Airline Economices, Inc., Washington, D.C., January, 1990.
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Exhibit 2
Consolidation of Nationals 
Between 1986 and 1991
Start of 1986 Disposition End of 1991
Aircal--------------------------Merged into American
Air Wisconsin -............................................................  Air Wisconsin
Alaska........................................................................ — Alaska
Aloha ..................... ........... ........... -.......-................... Aloha
America West-------------------------------------------- -------America West
American Trans Air ......................................-...........  American Trans Air
Braniff...........................................................................  Braniff
Frontier---------------- Merged into People Express
Hawaiian---------------------------------------------------------- Hawiian
Midway........................ -Bankruptcy, 12-91..........Midway
MCM Grand----- -------.........................-------- ---------- MGM Grand
New York Air-------------Merged into Texas Air Corp.
Ozark........... -................Merged into TWA
Pacific Southwest........Merged into USAir
People Express ............ Merged into Texas Air Corp.
Southwest----------------------- -------------- ------------------  Southwest
Trans America —........Ceased Scheduled Passenger Operations
Transtar....................— Merged into Southwest
World.............................-Ceased Scheduled Passenger Operations
Air Wisconsin.............................................................. Air Wisconsin
Jet America---------------- Bought by Alaska
21 Carriers 10 Carriers
Source: Adapted from Airline Consolidation. (Wash., D.C.: Airline 
Eco., Inc., 1987) p. 20, and FAA Aviation Forecasts. Fiscal Years 1990- 
2001. U.S. D.O.T., Fed. Aviation Administration, pp. 221-223.
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The fact is that, today, not only have the possible combina­
tions among airlines been reduced significantly but if and when 
any mergers are attempted, they will be closely scrutinized by 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, In addition, 
there are relatively few airports that serve as hubs for more than 
one airline. Hubs are airports in major cities/metropolitan areas 
that serve as collection points for passengers and cargo. 
RECIONALS transport passengers and freight from outlying 
areas into a Hub location via spokes (routes). Major and/or 
National airlines complete the move by carrying the passengers 
and/or freight to their final destinations via other spokes (routes). 
As a result of the small number of hubs serving more than one 
airlinecompany, the antitrustanalysiswill likely tend tofocuson 
an assessment of an airline mergers'impact on national concen­
tration levels. However, the more immediate question is "What 
strategies do airline companies develop for one, three, five, and 
ten years in the future that will avoid incurring the wrath of the 
Antitrust Division of DOJ?"
Four alternatives provide a short but non-exclusion list to 
this strategic planning question. (1) One of which is to go "BACK 
TO THE FUTURE!" If we return to the year 1978 when 
deregulation (of the passenger segment of the airline industry - 
air cargo having been deregulated in 1977) - was the WAVE OF 
THE FUTURE, we find that deregulation was to become the 
FUTURE of the airline industry. Although, it is not "JUST" the 
deregulation of the American domestic airline industry that is 
charting the flight plan of domestic and international airline 
operations of the future. It is DOMESTIC DEREGULATION, 
INTERNATIONAL DEREGULATION (e.g., Europe, 1992) and 
WORLD EVENTS (e.g., Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitand subsequent 
United Nations sanctioned trade embargo) of the most recent 
months, weeks, and days.
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The other three alternatives to the strategic planning ques­
tion include the options of (2) developing marketing alliances 
not only with foreign air carriers but with national/global hotel 
and restaurant chains as well; (3) ownership changes (discussed 
later), and even the different forms of (4) frequent flyer 
agreements.
Globalization
Globalization is a strategic alliance alternative for which the 
airline carriers do not have an option if they plan to remain 
competitive. That is, they must globalize their operations simply 
to be able to remain competitive not only with their domestic 
counterparts but with the foreign-based international carriers as 
well. It is a strategic change forced on the industry by domestic 
and international deregulation. Globalization of the U.S. Airline 
industry began in 1977 and 1978 with the deregulation of the 
cargo and passenger segments respectively. Eventually, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and other countries 
experimented with deregulation, liberalization and even 
privatization of their airline industries. It should be remembered 
that deregulation of the airline industry, domestically and 
internationally, has erupted upon the scene as a result of forces 
outside of the control of the airline industry. Globalization is the 
airship flying toward tomorrow; (domestic and international) 
deregulation is the current state-of-the-art fuel being used to 
power the ship; North America and Europe probably were the 
first two passengers on that ship to buy - but not pay for - their 
tickets. Many other passengers (i.e., countries/airline compa­
nies) are scrambling for tickets by jockeying for a position in the 
line that is forming.
The European Common Market added fuel to the fire of 
regulatory liberalization with the Treaty of Rome test of airline 
competition and pricing in the 1986 Nouvelles Frontieres case 
which held that the rules of competition which exist under the
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Treaty of Rome do, indeed, apply to aviation. At that point, the 
FUTURE was developing around an attempt to foster overall 
economic airline integration in Europe which would set up a 
chain reaction around the world.8
As a result, North America and Europe, two of the three 
major developed regions of the world, are moving rapidly to 
structurally change air transportation into an arena of open 
competition by initiating strategic alternatives available to them 
in the deregulated world of the airline industry. Airline compa­
nies in the rest of the world, including the less developed 
regions, are searching for and signing up partners with whom to 
dance to the new tune the world is now playing. As a result of 
domestic and international deregulation, mergers, consolida­
tions, and bankruptcies, these relationships between the airline 
companies are developing into important strategic alternatives 
identified earlier; (1) marketing alliances, (2) ownership changes, 
and the (3) frequent flyer agreements.
Analysis of Globalized Strategies 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Of the many types of alliances available to enterprising 
airline companies, the three most important are Marketing, 
Equity and Frequent Flyer Programs. The last few years has 
seen a dramatic increase in all three types. Out of one-hundred, 
seventy-two alliances identified by Mead Jennings in the Au­
gust, 1990 issue of AIRLINE BUSINESS, eighty-two of the 
agreements (47.67%) involved equity investments. More spe­
cifically, fifty-six per cent of these 82 agreements were made in 
the last five years (see TABLE 6, APPENDIX). TABLE 4 is an 
abstract of the strategic alliances of the U.S. domestic air carriers 
with domestic and foreign-based air carriers. An example is the 
first truly “global" alliance between Delta, Singapore and 
Swissair which includes the coordination of international fares 
and flight schedules, the loaning of flight attendants and the 
possibility of joint buying opportunities.9
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Marketing Alliances
In the category of Marketing Alliances, we find the British 
Airways and United agreement to coordinate schedules and to 
share codes of international flights; but no equity swaps. Carried 
to an extreme, one would find a route-specific agreement 
which refers to an agreement between two airlines regarding 
the contribution of each airline to a cooperative effort over a 
specific route (e.g. New York to London). The equity swap - 
another name for alliance partners buying into each other - is 
a relatively new variation on the much older marketing alliance 
theme. It is interesting to note that American Airlines serves as 
a partner to seven other major airlines; Aer Lingus, Air New 
Zealand, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Malev, Qantas, and Singapore 
Airlines. American has picked up an equity position (7.5%) in 
only one of these airlines; Air New Zealand. Conversely, these 
same seven airlines serve as partners for American with Air New 
Zealand holding a 7.5% equity position in American Airlines. 
Among these seven partners, American has only one wide- 
ranging marketing alliance with Qantas. The other six alliances 
are route-or market-specific agreements.
TABLE 4 provides some insight into the relationships that 
have been established among the airline companies of the 
world and U.S. airline companies. The last column indicates 
what kind of relationship exists between any two carriers;"M" 
means there is a wide-ranging marketing alliance agreement 
between the two carriers; "R" means the agreement covers 
only a specific route/market; "J" means there is a joint venture 
between the two firms; "C" means the agreement is for cargo 
only and "MAN" means there is a management contract in 
existence.10
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Table 4
Stategic Alliances









AER LINGUS AMERICAN R
AEROFLOT PAN AM M
AIR CANADA TWA M
AIR-INDIA TWA R
AIR MICRONESIA ALOHA 10
CONTINENTAL 30
AIR NEW ZEALAND AMERICAN 7.5
ALITALIA USAIR M
ALL NIPPON TWA R
ALOHA AIR MICRONESIA 10
AMERICAN AER LINCUS R






AMERICA WEST ANSETT 20
ANSETT AMERICA WEST 20
AUSTRALIAN UNITED R
BRITISH AW DELTA R
UNITED M
CANADIAN AIR. MIDWAY R
CATHAY PACIFIC AMERICAN R
CONTINENTAL AIR MICRONESIA 30
SAS 9.9 M
KEY: * = PLANNED; **=SUBJECT TO REGULATORY APPROVAL; M =WIDE-
RANGINC MARKETING ALLIANCE; REROUTE OR MARKET SPECIFIC ALLI­
ANCE; J=JOINT VENTURE; C=CARGO; MAN =MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
SOURCE: Jennings, Mead. “Strategic Illusions", AIRLINE BUSINESS. August, 
1990, pages 27, 28 & 30.










DELTA BRITISH AW R
SINGAPORE 2.8 M
SWISSAIR 5 4.6 M
FINNAIR AMERICAN R
GULF AIR TWA R
HAWAIIAN JAPAN AL 25





MIDWAY CANADIAN AL R
NORTHWEST KLM 14.9
PAN AM AEROFLOT M
PHIl IPPINE Al TWA R
QANTAS AMERICAN AL M
SAS CONTINENTAL 9.9 M
SINGAPORE AL AMERICAN R
DELTA 5 2.8






KEY: * = PLANNED; **=SUBJECT TO REGULATORY APPROVAL; M =WIDE-
RANGING MARKETING ALLIANCE; R = ROUTE OR MARKET SPECIFIC ALLI­
ANCE; J=JOINT VENTURE; C=CARGO; MAN=MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
SOURCE: Adpated from: Jennings, Mead. “Strategic Illusions", AIRLINE BUSI­
NESS. August, 1990, pages 2 7, 28 & 30.
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Equity Alliances
It is sometimes difficult to separate the new variation . . . 
equity partnerships .. . from the old marketing alliance theme. 
The practice of alliance partners buying into each other has 
quickly gained acceptance in the airline industry even though 
the strategy is expensive and time consuming. Delta holds a 5% 
equity in Swissair who holds a 4.6% equity in Delta. The 
reciprocal 7.5% equity holdings of American and Air New 
Zealand were mentioned earlier. The largest equity holdings 
are the reciprocal amounts of Air Micronesia and Continental 
Airlines at 30% each. Japan Air Lines and Hawaiian Airlines run 
a close second with 25% each. The smallest equity positions are 
those of Singapore and Delta Airline Companies at 2.8% each. 
These equity holdings are looked upon by some as a method of 
cementing the relationship between two airlines for the long 
run. Those who oppose equity swaps do not see the need for 
the investments. To the opponents, the in vestments are nothing 
more than wasted management time and an inappropriate use 
of investors' money. To many, equity alliances are becoming 
a symptom of airlines in distress. Others see them as defensive 
postures which Delta readily admits that the 5% stakes it sold to 
Singapore and Swissair helped to fend off take over attempts 
which were in the wings just before the alliance took place.
To understand more clearly why the industry feels there is 
a need for marketing and equity alliances, a look at the industry 
in terms of traffic and capacity should provide some clues.
Frequent Flyer Program/Alliances
How can an airline play the passenger number-game and 
win? However an airline wins new customers - merger, consoli­
dation, buyout, takeover, route purchase, new authority, dis­
count fares, or other promotional programs-it must retain them 
as customers. One of the current favorite methods is the 
frequent flyer program. This program allows a passenger to bank 
his/her flight miles for the purpose of qualifying for a free trip for 
the passenger, his/her spouse or children, free rental cars, hotel 
accommodations or some other discounted fare.
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For instance, Delta Air Lines' frequent flyer program is 
supported by a partnership agreement with Air Canada, Air 
New Zealand, Japan Airlines, Lufthansa, KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines, Singapore Airlines and Swissair. These air carriers, 
except Japan Airlines, allow the passenger to earn 100% of their 
actual mileage in Economy Class; from 125% to 150% in 
Business Class and 1 50% to 200% in First Class.
Delta also has partnership agreements with Alamo, Avis 
and National car rental firms. For those needing to spend the 
night, the agreement extends to Hyatt Hotels, Marriott Hotels, 
Preferred Hotels, Trusthouse Forte or Hilton Hotels/Hilton 
International. Passengers are eligible to earn 1,000 miles bonus 
credit each from the car rental firm and/or hotel.
Delta also extends an invitation to join the Crown Room 
Club which offers an array of services, complimentary bever­
ages, meeting areas for business associates and special travel 
services ranging from assistance with check-in, seat assignments 
and boarding passes to personal check cashing privileges. Single 
membership is available at $1 50.00 per year; $200 for a 
member with spouse or the deduction of 30,000 miles from the 
member's Frequent Flyer mileage for one year single member­
ship or 40,000 miles deduction for member with spouse.
Continental Airlines' Frequent Flyer Program is called 
ONEPASS and includes the following partners: Continental 
Express, Aer Lingus, Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, 
Sabena, SAS and The Trump Shuttle. Continental allows a 
passenger who doesn't have sufficient mileage for a specific 
reward to "lock in" the current mileage level required for 
qualification for a period of up to three years or until his account 
accrues the required mileage. A passenger who is short on 
mileage for a particular reward, may purchase up to 20% of the 
necessary mileage for $20 per 1000 miles.
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Continental also has agreements with several car rental 
firms. These include National, Europcar, Tilden, General Hertz 
and Thrifty. Its hotel accommodations include Marriott, Camino 
Real, Westin, (Compri) Hotels by Doubletree, Consort, 
Doubletree Hotels, The Radisson Hotels, and Wyndham Ho­
tels. These hotels offer 500 miles per stay at the published retail 
or corporate rate.
United Airlines has a large compliment of partner firms 
through which a passenger can earn Frequent Flyer mileage. Of 
the airlines, these include Air France, Alitalia, Aloha Airlines, 
Aloha Island Air, British Airways, Iberia Airlines of Spain, KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines, Lufthansa German Airlines, SABENA 
World Airlines, SAS, and Swissair. A 25% mileage bonus is 
available for a paid Business Class reservation and 50% bonus 
for paid First Class travel on United.
If a passenger charges his flight ticket, he will receive one 
mile for every dollar charged to a Mileage Plus, First Card Visa, 
Mileage Plus First Card Gold, Master Card Gold, or United 
Airlines Travel Card.
Participatingcarriers with American Airlines include Ameri­
can Eagle, British Airways, Cathay Pacific Airways, Qantas 
Airways, and Singapore Airlines.
American's car rental agreements include Avis and Hertz. 
Hotels accommodations are available through Hilton Hotels 
and Resorts, Inter Continental Hotels, Forum Hotels, ITT 
Sheraton, Marriott Hotels and Resorts and Wyndham Hotels 
and Resorts. Frequent Flyer Passengers can earn 500 mileage 
credits per night and a complimentary split of champagne by 
providing his/her "AAdvantage" number upon check-in at any 
Inter Continental or Forum Hotel. These mileage credits can be 
earned for up to seven consecutive nights per property (hotel) 
per calendar month.
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USAir, in addition to its Frequent Flyer Program which 
seems to be a stand-alone program that is not associated with 
any other airline company, has segmented its total market into 
several sub-markets. Two of the more prominent segmented 
programs are Military Fares and Senior Savers. Military person­
nel on active duty and their dependents can get 50% discounts 
off regular coach fares to cities in the United States and Puerto 
Rico. Dependents are eligible for 50% discounts even if they are 
not traveling with their active duty family member. Substantial 
discounts of up to 75% of economy class fares are offered to and 
from European destinations.
For those 62 years of age or older, USAir offers two special 
ways to save on flights; 10% discounted Senior Saver Fare and 
Golden Opportunities Coupon Books which come in two 
packages of four one-way coupons for $473 or eight one-way 
coupons for $790. A number of restrictions apply which tend to 
reduce the overall benefits.
In addition to strategic alliances, there are many other 
methods available to carry out perceived future market oppor­
tunities. In addition, to those already mentioned - mergers and 
acquisitions; geographical (regional) alliances; marketing alli­
ances, computer reservations system (CRS) consortia - must be 
added the formulation of trading blocs such as the “United 
States of Europe - the European Economic Community (EEC) of 
1992" and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) which is the 
EEC's largest trading partner with six countries (Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden & Switzerland).11
In Europe, London's two main airports, Heathrow and 
Gatwick, lie at the heart of a global network of air services. They 
are the two busiest international airports in the world.12 Britain 
also has more than 20 major regional airports - serving such 
cities as Belfast, Birmingham, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds, Manches­
ter and Newcastle. Tying into an extensive domestic network, 
they also have direct international links.13
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Together, Britain's airports handle over 7,000 international 
flights each week. They also service about 5,000 domestic 
flights per week, many of them "shuttles" - linking the United 
Kingdom's (UK) major commercial and industrial centers within 
one hour's flying time of each other.14
There are more than fifty (50) airlines operating in the 
United Kingdom, handling approximately 26 million passen­
gers annually and, in 1988, the UK's airports shipped nearly 800 
thousand tons of cargo.15
However, there are only three domestic carriers in the 
United States that are already putting the various alliances, 
mentioned above, together and who have the best chance of 
survival and profitability over the long term; i.e., American, 
Delta and United (assuming someone can clear up United's 
ownership confusion in the very near future). These three 
airlines have the greatest probability of survival and profitability 
because they have the CRSs, the large dispersed hubs, the 
equipment is either on hand or on order, and their international 
routes are growing 16
American has gradually become (along with Pan Am, until 
it ceased operations in December, 1991) the major U.S. Carrier 
in Miami, American Airlines has a 29-point Caribbean system 
that is the largest of any domestic airline and is closing ground 
on Eastern Airlines' old Latin network by receiving, on March 8, 
1990, clearance from the Justice Department to purchase 
Eastern's Latin routes. The $349 million sale must still be 
approved by the Department of Transportation and the federal 
bankruptcy court overseeing Eastern's re-organization. The 
new authority will give American Airlines control of a 20-city 
network in Central and South America.17
By comparison, British Airways and Air France have posi­
tioned themselves better than even American, Delta or United 
since they command over 95% of their home markets, com­
pared to the 1 5% - 1 8% controlled by American or Delta.18
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Other European carriers are following British Airways' and 
major U.S. air carriers' lead who are rushing to gain access to 
Western European gateways before 1992. For instance, KLM 
took a large stake in Northwest and a small share of Air UK. 
Swissair and SAS have agreed to take a 10% share of each other 
while Air France and Lufthansa have formed their own alli­
ance.19
The smaller carriers must rely on international traffic to 
grow and are being very creative in reaching for ownership and 
alliances. For example, SAS isnow allied with Continental in the 
U.S.; Lan-Chile in South America; Swissair in Europe to tap the 
Middle East and Africa; and Thai in Asia. Another strategy of 
SAS's Jan Carlzon is that he has adopted former United 
Chairman Dick Ferris's concept of building a door-to-door 
travel network with hotels, reservations systems and car rentals. 
All of this links together information distribution systems, 
ground transportation systems and airport ground services. 
Very simply, SAS's Chairman Carlzon intends to capture the 
passenger from the moment he leaves the home or office to the 
moment he returns.20
Tactical Implementation of Strategies
North America and Europe are the two major powers in the 
move toward a globalized airline industry. Europeans are using 
the tactic of dividing U.S. air carriers to capture U.S. market 
share with various alliances. The tactic is working because it is 
often in the interest of individual U.S. carriers to build interna­
tional ties with foreign operators even though such action will 
undermine their own U.S. competition. It is the highly competi­
tive atmosphere that allows U.S. carriers to be segmented by 
foreign carriers and this segmentation process makes it easier to 
access U.S. markets through these ownership and marketing 
alliances.21
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For example, a foreign carrier looks for two U.S. domestic 
carriers which are competing for traffic originating within the 
United States but which has a foreign destination through an 
international departure point in the United States. The foreign 
carrier creates an alliance with the U.S. carrier which cannot fly 
out of that departure point to international destinations. As a 
result, the foreign carrier obtains (at least part of) the interna­
tional traffic rather than the other U.S. carrier that did have 
international operating authority.
In this situation, European carriers hold a significant com­
petitive advantage because domestic competition, while in­
tense in the United States among air carriers, is virtually non­
existent among the major foreign carriers since there is essen­
tially only one large carrier in each home market. Therefore, if 
a U.S. air carrier wants to create an alliance with a foreign carrier 
overseas and the foreign carrier says "NO", the U.S. carrier has 
no option and, very simply, has no access to that specific 
market.22
On the other hand, if one domestic carrier in a U.S. market 
(Hub) says "NO" to an alliance proposal of a foreign carrier, 
there are often as many as seven (7) or eight (8) other U.S. 
domestic carriers with whom the foreign carrier can create 
alliances or take an equity position. Financially more important, 
if the foreign carrier can develop an alliance, the market 
accessed by the foreign carrier can often rival the size of its home 
market. For example, British Airways (B.A.) Deputy Chairman 
Colin Marshall calls its agreement with United "the best rela­
tionship of any two airlines." (and) "We are very complemen­
tary and the combination of the two from a marketing stand­
point makes all the sense it did originally." The reason that it 
does make good sense for the foreign carrier is because British 
Airway's agreement with United gives it access to 48% of the 
world's international scheduled passenger traffic when, other­
wise, it would only have access to 1 7% of that market!23 
Speaking of markets for air travel, just how does the United 
States compare with Europe?
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EXHIBIT 3 illustrates the point that U.S. Majors accounted 
for 330 million or 39.3% of the passengers enplaning world 
carrier systems in 1988. It also compares the United States 
(Major) carriers with two other categories; European Common 
Market (E. E.C.) - including the European FreeTrade Association 
EFTA). The European Common Market, including the EFTA, 
enplaned only 145 million (out of 840 total enplaned passen­
gers) customers for a 1 7.3% share of the market. All other world 
carriers enplaned a total of 365 passengers for a 43.4% share of 
this lucrative market which must be split among a number of 
smaller carriers. Carried one step further, EXHIBIT 4 illustrates 
the percentage of total traffic (Shown on the left-hand Y-axis) for 
six geographical areas- North America, Domestic[N.A.(D)]; Far 
East (F.East); Europe (Intercontinental); North America (Inter­
national); Europe-lntra, and a miscellaneous category of Oth­
ers. Exhibit 4 also estimates the growth experienced in 1989 
and forecasts the expected growth for a six-year period (1990 
-1995) for these areas. It is interesting to note that the Far East 
had the greatest estimated percentage growth in 1989 and is 
expected also to again be the leader in growth during the six- 
year period 1990 - 1995. Ignoring the category of "Others", 
Europe (intercontinental) is forecasted to be second in growth 
and North America (International) third behind the first two 
positions.
Yet the first five positions, in rank order, of net increase in 
international passenger enplanements are staffed with two 
foreign air carriers, British Airway and Lufthansa. EXHIBIT 5 
shows that the second five positions have only two American air 
carriers, Continental and Pan Am. One might say that as far as 
enplanements are concerned American air carriers are only 
handling fifty percent while the other half is being shared by a 
number of different countries.
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American air carriers do not fare much better in a ranking 
of the top 50 airline companies by profits. Table 5 indicates that 
only two American airlines - United and American - were 
numbers one and two, respectively, out of the top five airlines; 
Alitalia, Cathay Pacific, and British Airways occupied third, 
fourth, and fifth places, respectively.
In the second group of five airline companies, the United 
States again had only two representatives - Delta and Trans 
World - who occupied the sixth and eight places, respectively. 
And once again, the other three positions were held by firms 
from foreign countries; Singapore (7), Iberia (9), and Air France 
(10). Therefore, only four American carriers are ranked in the 
ten most profitable air carriers in the world, The other six 
positions are held by air carriers from six different countries. 
Competition, based on profitability on a global basis, is cur­
rently alive and doing very well!
When ranked by passengers enplaned in 1988, the United 
States air carriers occupied three of the top five positions; 
United (1), American (3), and Delta (4). Trans World Airlines (6) 
and British Airways (7) were the only other air carriers that were 
ranked in the top ten most profitable carriers that were also 
ranked in the top ten carriers when ranked by enplaned 
passengers in 1988. In other words, five of the most profitable 
airline carriers were more economical in operating their com­
panies than five other companies that carried more passengers 
but made less profit. For example, Texas Air was ranked 46th 
in profitability but 2nd in the number of passengers carried. Pan 
American ranked 43rd in profitability but 9th in passengers 
enplaned.
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Table 5
The Top 50 Airline Companies 
Ranked by Profits and Passenger Miles
(Billions)
(Millions) 1988 Passenger 
Company & Rank/Profit Country '88 Profits Miles and Rank
1. United Air Lines U.S. $1, 124.3 69.1 (1)
2. American Air Lines U.S. 476.8 64.8 (3)
3. Alitalia Italy 368.6
4. Cathay Pacific Hong Kong 361.6
5. British Airways Britain 331.3 30.5 (7)
6. Delta U.S. 306.8 49.1 (4)
7. Singapore Singapore 299.0
8. Trans World U.S. 249.7 34.8 (6)
9. Iberia Spain 208.2
10. Air France France 193.5
1 2. USAir Croup U.S. 30.4 (8)
1 4. Japan Air Lines Japan 28.3 (10)
1 7. Northwest Airlines U.S. 40.1 (5)
43. Pan American U.S. 29.0 (9)
46. Texas Air U.S. 69.0 (2)
Source: Woods, Wilton. "Revolution in the Air", Fortune. January 
1, 1990, pp. 58-59.
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Specifically, in the international market, we find that U.S. 
Majors - as illustrated in EXHIBIT 6 - carried only 35 million of 
the total 294 million international passengers in 1988. This 
represented only 1 2% of the total while the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the Europe Free Trade Area (EFTA), and the 
Eastern Europe carrier system accounted for 91 million passen­
gers or 31% of the total, Other carriers accounted for the 
balance of 168 million (57%).
EXHIBIT 7 shows the relative market position of the 
European Common Market air carriers in terms of enplaned 
passengers. British Airways (B.A.) leads the group with 23 
million enplaned passengers in 1988 for a market share of 21 % 
of the 107 million total passengers. Sabena Airlines had the 
smallest share of only 1.8% or 2 million enplaned passengers. 
Iberia, Air France, and Alitalia were all tied for third place with 
14% representing 15 million enplaned passengers. Lufthansa 
was second with 16.8% (18 million passengers), a full 4.2% 
behind first place British Airways.
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) did not have 
the volume of passengers but competition was thriving never­
theless. Of the total 26.8 million passengers, SAS enjoyed a 
49.6% (1 3.3 million passengers) share of the market. Swissair 
enplaned 7.1 million passengers for a 26.49% market share. A 
distant third place was held by Finnair (14.2% market share with 
3.8 million passengers) which enplaned only 53.5% of the 
volume enjoyed by Swissair and less than a third (28.6%) of the 
volume of SAS Airlines. Fourth and fifth places were occupied 
by Austrian Airlines (1.8 passengers or 6.7%) and Icelandair (.8 
passengers or 2.98%) respectively (see EXHIBIT 8).
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Impact of Domestic and Global Factors
The impact of all of these factors is that airline management 
must recognize that one of the areas of the FUTURE for the 
airline industry will be in GLOBALIZATION - WHICH IS BEING 
FOSTERED ON THE AIRLINE COMMUNITY BY DEREGULA­
TION ON A DOMESTIC AND AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL - 
as witnessed by American's purchase of Eastern's Latin America 
routes; THE EQUITY POSITIONS BEING TAKEN BY NUMER­
OUS AIRLINE COMPANIES IN OTHER MEMBERS OF THE 
AIRLINE COMMUNITY ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS; the 
marketing alliances being developed between U.S. domestic 
airlines and foreign carriers; joint computer reservations sys­
tems, and the deregulation of the European Economic Commu­
nity by 1992 are only a few examples of the move to globalization.
Management must not be mislead by the apparent increase 
in the intensity of competition amongcarriers. As time wears on, 
and it is found that more and more marketing alliances are 
developed by once competing carriers; AS MORE AIR CARRI­
ERS BECOME OWNERS OF OTHER AIR CARRIERS, as a few 
forced mergers (because of economic circumstances - Pan Am 
has lost $1.1 billion since 1 984)24 take place and as individual 
carriers stake out their respective niches, the industry will 
actually experience less competition. More specifically, the 
FUTURE of the airline industry is going to impact management 
by demanding more creative responses to such things as:
1. Fare increases that are probable not only over the next 
few months but over the next few years. This will be true 
especially in those markets in which carriers experience very 
little or no competition, However, management should be 
cautious in increasing its fares in markets where virtually no 
competition exists because of the possibility of pricing itself out 
of the market by driving the customers to other modes of 
transportation and/or attracting the attention of federal regula­
tors who still harbor the notion that the airline industry should 
be re-regulated.
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2. Even with increasing fares, service is likely to remain 
about the same - not withstanding USAir's President stating that 
" - (Service is) at the top of the heap right now."; in addition to 
the fact that USAir was FIRST in being LAST in ON-TIME 
ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES until most recently when it 
moved from LAST to FIRST! Managerially, costs must be kept 
in line in relation to revenue. However, the reduction of 
passenger services will likely draw the ire of the flyer unless the 
fare is reduced appropriately and the passenger knows when he 
purchases his ticket that it is a "No-Frills" flight. If this is not the 
case, management must become adept at "Non-Price" compe­
tition and communicate to the potential passenger the values 
he/she will receive for the price paid for the ticket; e,g., a larger 
selection of flight schedules, fewer (or no) changes between 
origin and destination, wider seats, ground services, etc.
3. Ownership is going to be the key to the future develop­
ment of worldwide airline services according to the recent 
trends in airline ownership through equity alliances. You can 
find the future survivors if you find the owners of other airlines, 
hubs, computer reservation systems (CRS's), and new equip­
ment. Ownership provides greater control than marketing 
alliances. Major examples include: DELTA'S 5% equity swap 
with Swissair and Singapore; AMERICAN'S do-it-yourself phi­
losophy (even though it owns a piece of Air New Zealand); 
KLM's partial ownership of NORTHWEST and 20% of SABENA 
and SAS which hasa piece, it seems, of almost everybody -9.9% 
of Texas Air; unspecified portions of Lan-Chile and Thai; 24% 
of Airlines of Britain which is currently seeking authority through 
British Midlands. A financial link of 5%-10% has been proposed 
between SAS and Swissair, Both of these airlinesare establishing 
links with Finnairin order to serve the Eastern European market. 
While the Austrian government has reduced its share of Austrian 
Airlines to 51 %, Swissair is attempting to increase its share from 
the current 8% to 10%; All Nippon has 3.5% which it hopes to 
increase to 5%; Air France has 1.5% and Lufthansa has shown 
interest in taking a 10% share.25
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Management should be aware that changes in the owner­
ship of airline companies could mean significant changes in the 
labor market. One possibility is that fewer managerial jobs might 
be available in the domestic market while employment oppor­
tunities could well increase on the international level. This could 
demand increased mobility of airline employees not only within 
the continental United States but globally also. Management 
should prepare for the eventual negotiation of labor contracts 
that cross continental borders for all levels of employees.
4. Another important consideration for management as 
both marketing and equity alliances increase in popularity si 
control. Equity, as mentioned, allows for reciprocal marketing 
practices over which control can be exerted by the owning 
partner(s). That control can easily be extended to the marketing 
alliances and the marketing function of pricing. Management 
will have to be extremely careful to avoid even the appearance 
of collusion in pricing practices. Deregulation was implemented 
because their was a desire to increase competition. Deregula­
tion removes external controls over many marketing practices 
which the industry and its individual members are now going to 
have to police.
5. The FUTURE for the airline industry? Probably five or six 
mega-worldwide carriers by the year 2000 with each having a 
subsidiary operation in North America, Europe and Asia. There 
will be niche airlines, largely state owned or under state 
controls, operating in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. 
These niche airlines will, of course, avoid free market compe­
tition as much as possible. In order to avoid this free market 
competition as much as possible, management must develop its 
expertise in market segmentation through the practice of 
Market Targeting (identifying the specific market(s) to be 
served) and Target Marketing (developing a marketing mix - 
product differentiation - that appears to satisfy the demands of 
each specific market).
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6. Those air carriers surviving in the year 2000 will fall into 
one of three categories: (1) Proactive (Examples: American, 
British Airways, Delta, United, Air France), (2) Active: Wait- 
and-See (Examples: Northwest, Continental, Iberia), and (3) 
Reactive (Examples: Niche carriers such as Singapore, Swissair 
and others from Africa, Latin America and the Middle East).26 
Management will decide into which of these three categories its 
airline company will participate by the goals, strategies, and 
action plans it develops. Butthe important point is that manage­
ment must make a decision or, at least, recognize the decision 
that has been forced upon it by the strategies that have been 
developed. If management does not make a conscious deci­
sion, competition will force it into one of these categories by 
forcing the company to take specific managerial actions regard­
ing such things as passengers fares, service, and flight schedules. 
It is always more convenient to decide a competitive issue than 
to have it decided by competitors.
Conclusion
Macro-industry analysis tells us that the major U.S. players 
in the game will be reduced in number. This reduction contin­
ues in the month of December, 1991 as two more carriers are 
lost to bankruptcy: Midway and Pan American. However, 
macro-analysis also tells us that the airline industry will become 
more globalized and that competition on this level will increase 
significantly. Deregulation was once the future of the airlines. 
But deregulation led to competition at home and abroad. It now 
appears that nearly the whole world wants a piece of the action. 
Out of the ten most profitable airline companies in the world, 
the United States claimed only four positions; the First, Second, 
Sixth, and Eighth. The other six slots represented six different 
countries - Italy, Hong Kong, Britain, Singapore, Spain, and 
France. When ranked by passenger miles, INSTEAD OF PROF­
ITABILITY, one-half of the top-ten companies changed their
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positions. The U.S. maintained its four positions but was only 
able to place a firm in the First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth 
rankings.
Part of the answer to the question is that airline companies 
are going to have to BECOME INVOLVED IN STRATEGIC 
PLANNING IN ORDER TO DEVELOP STRATEGIES OF 
GLOBALIZATION FOR EACH OF ITS MARKETS AND FOR 
THE COMPANY AS A WHOLE -A MASTER STRATEGY, IF YOU 
WILL. With the United States accounting for 330 million or 
39.3% of the passengers enplaning world carrier systems in 
1988, the world is beating a path to the front door of America 
(i.e., "THEY” . . . NOT "WE” . . . are developing marketing 
alliances with American airlinecompanies). Those whocan't get 
in the front door head for the back door (they buy a piece of an 
American airline firm); look for a window (share a computer 
reservations system - CRS) to squeeze through or simply buy out 
the entire company.
However, once the hype has diminished, the economic 
analyses have been completed, the mashing and gashing of 
teeth have subsided; the moaning and groaning have ceased; 
the knuckle cracking has been silenced, and finger pointing is a 
thing of the past, we will find that the air under the wings of the 
future of the airline industry will be provided by four elements: 
(1) Fares, (2) Service (MARKETING ALLIANCES), (3) Ownership 
(EQUITY ALLIANCES) and FREQUENT FLYER PROGRAM AL­
LIANCES. Given these four elements; given the direction of the 
industry today and baring interference by governmental bodies 
(i.e., baring a return to re-regulation), we sill see that there will 
be true worldwide mega-carriers by the year 2000. Whether 
mega-carriers will provide additional services, conveniences, 
lower fares, a greater variety of destinations or whether they will 
be regional/hub monopolies with high fares, limited services 
and fewer destinations remains to be seen.
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TABLE 6
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Carrier Partner
Carrier's Partner's
Equity In Equity In Pact
Partner(%) Carrier(%)
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KEY: * = PLANNED; **=SUBJECT TO REGULATORY APPROVAL; M = WIDE- 
RANGINC MARKETING ALLIANCE; R = ROUTE OR MARKET SPECIEIC ALLI­
ANCE; j = JOINT VENTURE; C=CARCO; MAN=MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
SOURCE: Jennings, Mead. "Strategic Illusions", AIRLINE BUSINESS. August, 
1990, pages 27, 28 & 30.
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KEY: * = PLANNED; **=SUBJECT TO RECULATORY APPROVAL; M = WIDE- 
RANGINC MARKETING ALLIANCE; R = ROUTE OR MARKET SPECIFIC ALLI­
ANCE; J=JOINT VENTURE; C = CARCO; MAN =MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
SOURCE: Jennings, Mead. "Strategic Illusions", AIRLINE BUSINESS. August, 
1990, pages 27, 28 & 30.
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